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During the first week of December, the U.S. President brought together the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace agreement. The commitment involved an end to decades of conflict in the volatile eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Weeks later, however, a starkly different method for violence emerged. Officials confirmed that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, hitting sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President declared, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Change of Direction

These divergent actions exemplifies the core principle of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a de-emphasis from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on economic deals and ending wars—even as this squares with the nascent air campaign in Nigeria is an open question.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a top U.S. state department official in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration representative reinforced this, saying the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Mixed Signals

This pivot is significant, but observers caution it is too soon to gauge its impact. The approach is influenced by the President’s direct manner, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained a senior fellow for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis forecasts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Geopolitical Apathy and Tensions

In contrast to his immediate predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known engagement with African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later admitted using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major feud has erupted with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Engagement and Selective Intervention

A comparable standoff appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the forceful rhetoric may have spurred the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Rivals

Observers describe the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the current policy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” she added.